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NOTES
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In two separate state proceedings, respondents' objections to evidence
allegedly obtained by unlawful searches and seizures were overruled at trial
and unsuccessfully argued on appeal. I Respondents'subsequently petitioned
for federal writs of habeas corpus 2 and secured relief in the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits.' The Supreme Court reversed and held that when a state has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment
claim, federal courts may not grant federal habeas corpus relief on the
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional Search and seizure was
introduced at trial. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
The writ of habeas corpus, developed early in common law' and
provided for in the United States Constitution, 5 was only available to federal
prisoners 6 until 1867 when Congress extended the remedy to state appli-
cants. 7 Originally, the Supreme Court limited the writ to those petitioners
who questioned the jurisdictional competence of the trial court; 8 but, in
1915, 9 the Court indicated that relief for grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction would be appropriate upon a finding that the state had failed to
provide an adequate "corrective process."'" The 1953 case of Brown v.
AllenI" further broadened habeas corpus to allow federal review of state
fact-finding even when the state corrective procedures were adequate. Final
I. The United States Supreme Court consolidated People v. Powell(Cal. Dist.
Ct. of App., Oct. 1969) and State v. Rice, 788 Neb. 728, 199N.W.2d480(1972), inthe
instant case, Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
2. Powell v. Stone (N.D. Cal. 1971) (relief denied); Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp.
185 (D. Neb. 1974) (relief granted).
3. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975) (affirming the district court's
grant of relief); Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing the district
court's denial of relief).
4. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 444 & n.6 (1963).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
6. E.g., Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
7. The Habeas Corpus Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385. For a discussion
of the Act see Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 31 (1965).
8. E.g., Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895).
9. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
10. Id. at 335. Bator, supra note 4, at 489 n. 131. The new grounds included any
constitutional violation where a state failed to provide an adequate remedy. E.g.,
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (issue was the effective assistance of counsel).
11. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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expansion by the Court in 1963 eliminated the requirement that petitioners
exhaust state remedies prior to applying to the federal courts' 2 and further
expanded the fact-finding powers of the federal district courts.' 3 But
recently the Court has departed from this expansive trend and has limited
the scope of habeas corpus. ' 4
Although the fourth amendment exclusionary rule was first applied to
the federal courts in 1914,5 it was not imposed upon the states until 1961, in
Mapp v. Ohio. 16 The Court justified this rule by stressing the "imperative of
judicial integrity" and the need to deter improper police conduct. 7 Subse-
quent decisions have restricted the rule's application by balancing these
justifications against competing interests.8
Every new fourteenth amendment right judicially formulated for the
protection of criminal defendants has furnished new grounds for habeas
corpus relief,' 9 and the exclusionary rule, prior to the instant case, was no
exception. The Court enforced the rule in habeas actions on numerous
occasions without discussing the issue of whether federal habeas corpus is
an appropriate forum for litigating violations of the fourth amendment.2"
12. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
13. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Prior to this decision, where the state
court had held an evidentiary hearing, federal district courts were restricted to a
review of undisputed facts from the state court's record. Townsend made evidentiary
hearings mandatory where the state court's evidentiary hearing was not found to be
full and fair. The requirements of Townsend and Fay were later embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 2254.
14. Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976) (when a state prisoner fails to
challenge timely the composition of the grand jury, federal courts will not grant
habeas corpus relief without a showing of cause and actual prejudice); Estelle v.
Williams, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976) (when a state prisoner is tried in prison garb and fails
to object timely, no habeas corpus relief will be granted absent a showing that the
state compelled his attire).
15. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
17. Id. at 658-59; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 668-69 (1970).
18. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury tradition of
openness outweighed the usefulness of the rule in grand jury proceedings); Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (state's interest in prosecuting crime necessi-
tates standing requirements for the use of the rule).
19. Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconvic-
tion Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928 (1964). The Supreme Court imposed "the rules of the
fourth, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments concerning unreasonable searches and
seizures, double jeopardy, speedy trial, compulsory self-incrimination, jury trial in
criminal cases, confrontation of adverse witnesses, assistance of counsel, and cruel
and unusual punishment, upon state criminal trials. . . .The result of these develop-
ments has been a vast expansion of the claims of error in criminal cases for which a
resourceful defense lawyer can find a constitutional basis." Friendly, Is Innocence
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Eventually, in Kaufman v. United States,2 the Supreme Cotrt confronted
this issue and held that failure to apply the exclusionary rule properly at trial
provided a basis for habeas corpus relief for federal prisoners2 2 and, in
dictum, indicated that the same was true for state applicants.23 Several
recent opinions have expressed disfavor with Kaufman's approach. 24
In the instant case, the Supreme Court examined the evolution of
habeas corpus, particularly noting the expanded use of the writ for the
review of alleged illegal searches and seizures. 2 The majority26 stated that
this expansion had occurred without a full evaluation of whether such a
remedy should be available for fourth amendment claims and that the
Kaufman analysis thus should be reconsidered in light of the nature and
purpose of the exclusionary rule. 27 The Court concluded that the rule is not a
personal right, but a judicially formulated device for the purpose of
deterring illegal police conduct. 28 Following previous decisions which
balanced various costs and benefits to determine the most effective areas in
which to apply the rule, the Court decided that in a habeas corpus
proceeding the benefits of the rule are outweighed by the costs of applying
it. 2
9
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 155-56
(1971).
20. E.g., Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364(1968); Carafas v. Lavalle, 391 U.S.
234 (1968).
21. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
22. Kaufman involved a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the post-
conviction remedy available to federal prisoners. The grounds for relief under § 2255
include those grounds found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (habeas corpus relief for state
prisoners).
23. 394 U.S. at 225.
24. Justice Harlan stated that this expansion of habeas corpus jurisdiction
"constitutes an unsound extension of the historic scope of the writ..."Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684-85 (1971); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
260-62 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a detailed discussion see the concurring
opinion of Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
25. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3042-45 (1976).
26. The majority opinion was delivered by Justice Powell with Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurring. A separate concurring opinion was
issued by Chief Justice Burger. The dissenting opinions were delivered by Justices
Brennan and White with Justice Marshall concurring in Brennan's dissent.
27. Stone "rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability of the
exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state court decisions pursuant to
§ 2254. To the extent the application of the exclusionary rule in Kaufmandid not rely
upon the supervisory role of. . . [the] court over the lower federal courts,. . . the
rationale for its application in that context is also rejected." 96 S. Ct. at 3045 n. 16.
28. Id. at 3048.
29. Id. at 3048-52. Commenting on the costs of applying the rule, the Court found
1976]
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The Stone decision reveals that there is a point in the criminal justice
process at which the right to invoke the exclusionary rule detaches. 3' The
majority maintains that this detachment occurs sometime prior to federal
collateral review and justifies this approach on the basis of the rule's
minimal deterrent value in habeas corpus. 31 The decision leaves the
possibility that, upon a finding that the exclusionary rule does not deter
police misconduct, it may be further modified or even abandoned.
32
The decision also creates uncertainties regarding the future of habeas
corpus. One reasonable explanation of Stone is that the Supreme Court was
motivated by policy considerations to abstain on behalf of the federal system
from relitigating fourth amendment claims when there has been full and fair
state adjudication.33 If the only policy with which the Court was concerned
is a desire to limit the reach of the fourth amendment, the decision will have
little effect upon the relationship of habeas corpus with other constitutional
rights. If, instead, the majority was also relying on an increasing confidence
that "the focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, is diverted
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. . . .Moreover, the physical
evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable. . . .Application of the rule thus
deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." The Court also found
that the benefit of deterrence ". . . would [not] be appreciably diminished if
search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus. ... Id. at
3049-50.
30. Cf. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the Court evaluated at what point
the need for counsel became critical and determined that the right to counsel attaches
at the initiation of the prosecution).
31. 96 S. Ct. at 3049-50.
32. The Court specifically stated that there is no evidence that the exclusionary.
rule has any deterrent effect upon the police, but for the purposes of this decision, the
deterrent effect would be assumed. Id. at 3051. Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion expresses disfavor with this assumption referring to it as "speculative and
unsubstantiated. .." Id. at 3054. It would appear that the presentation of convincing
evidence that there is no deterrent effect would rebut this presumption.
33. In a footnote, the majority states "we hold only that a federal court need not
apply the exclusionary rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim..."Id.
at 3052 n.37. Read in isolation, this would appear to indicate that the district courts
would still have discretion in deciding whether to entertain such claims; but, read in
context, the language suggests that the Supreme Court, and not the lower federal
courts, has exercised its discretion in abstaining on behalf of the entire federal
system. Another recent decision specifically uses the abstention approach in refusing
to review claims of improper jury composition when the defendant failed to object
timely. The Court stated, "There can be no question of a federal district court's
power to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a case such as this
• ..This court has long recognized that in some circumstances considerations of
comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require a
federal court to forego the exercise of its habeas corpus power." Francis v.
Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 1710 (1976).
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in the state courts3 4 or attempting to arrest the recent increase in the federal
caseload,35 the decision may be an initial move to limit the entire area of
habeas corpus.
An alternative interpretation of Stone is that the Court was declaring
that since the respondents received full and fair litigation in state courts,
they were not being held in violation of the Constitution,3 6 which is a
requirement for the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus.37 If this
interpretation is correct, state prisoners may lack a cause of action for
habeas corpus petitions based on a formidable array of fifth38 and sixth39
amendment rights.'n
Stone does not forbid federal habeas corpus review of fourth amend-
ment claims; however, such review is permissible only upon a showing that
a state prisoner was denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his
claim in state court.4 Although the meaning of "full and fair litigation" is
34. See 96 S. Ct. at 3051 n.35. One writer considers the previous lack of
confidence in state courts to have been the basis for the expansion of habeas corpus.
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U.
PA. L. REV. 461, 466-72 (1960).
35. Bailey, Federal Habeas Corpus-Old Writ, New Role: An Overhaul for
State Criminal Justice, 45 B. U. L. REV. 161, 163-64 (1965).
36. The argument for this position is that the prisoner is legally detained if held
pursuant to sentence of a competent court, even though there may be an error of law
or fact, since the prisoner has been accorded procedural due process. Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174, 182 (1947); Bator, supra note 4, at 444-62; Friendly, supra note 19, at
152.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides: "The Supreme Court, a circuit justice, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. "
Justice Brennan, in dissent, proposes that the absence of this requirement would
remove jurisdiction from the federal courts. The better view is that jurisdiction
remains vested in the federal courts, but instead, the state prisoner loses his cause of
action.
38. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974) (right to Miranda
warnings); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968) (violation of the Federal Com-
munications Act prohibiting wiretapping); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)
(prohibition of comments by the judge or prosecutor on the failure of the defendant to
testify).
39. E.g., Destefeno v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968) (right to jury trial);
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967) (right to counsel at line-ups and show-ups).
40. This interpretation of Stone would appear to directly affect these rights.
They have been restricted in their application through the process of balancing and
exist in great part for the purpose of deterrence. See Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646, 655 & n.7 (1971).
41. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.37.
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not well developed in the decision,42 the Court did state that there must be an
opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claims at trial and on direct
review. 43 The decision does not indicate whether "full and fair" requires a
state appeal of right" and also leaves unclear whether the states must
provide any form of habeas corpus relief.45
Closely related to which state forums are required is the question of
what procedures will be considered adequate within these forums.46 The
Court has previously required that state defendants be provided the repre-
sentation of counsel at trial 7 and on appeal of right;48 but whether the Court
will also require the availability of counsel in state habeas corpus is
uncertain.49 Also, where a state prisoner was not permitted to raise his claim
at trial due to his failure to observe state procedural requirements, it would
appear the petitioner would be precluded from federal habeas corpus as long
as an opportunity to raise the claim was provided and the procedural
requirement served a legitimate state purpose.
50
42. Stone does not rely on the pre-Brown v. Allen decisions for the meaning of
"full and fair," although the opinion does refer to these cases in its historical
summary. These decisions found a lack of full and fair litigation where there was no
state remedy: Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), where the trial was a sham
and the state failed to correct this wrong; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923),
where the state failed to judge the issue because it was not raised in the proper forum;
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); and where the state practices denied state habeas
corpus relief, White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
43. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.37. Direct review should include, in addition to appeal, the
Supreme Court's writ of certiorari. It would also appear possible that the writ might
be granted to consider claims arising in state habeas corpus proceedings.
44. If the Court requires that the appeal be of right, then the decision will have a
significant impact in Louisiana, since appeal from certain convictions is discretion-
ary. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5 (appeal for imprisonment of six months or less).
45. For a discussion of the remedies provided by the states see Reitz, Federal
Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 461,
466-72 (1960).
46. In the pre-Brown era, the Court granted relief only if the procedures were so
inadequate as to deny due process. E.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
47. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel at trial extends to
all cases where the defendant is imprisoned).
48. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974) (constitution does not require appointed counsel on discretionary appeals
where there has been a previous appeal of right).
49. This requirement would have little effect upon Louisiana, since the state
supreme court has held that counsel must be appointed for all habeas corpus
proceedings where there is an evidentiary hearing. Cherry v. Cormier, 281 So. 2d 99,
102 (La. 1973). For a discussion of this issue see Note, 19 MIAMI L. REV. 432, 444
(1965).
50. See Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976).
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An alternative to fourth amendment claims which might provide access
to federal courts is the allegation of incompetent counsel. 5 The present
constitutional standard requires a showing of "gross error" and "serious
dereliction" in order for relief to be granted on this ground.52 Notwithstand-
ing these requirements, effective counsel is an expanding concept which
adapts to new circumstances. 53 Although courts have consistently held that
an attorney's failure to raise or properly argue an issue is not grounds for
granting defendant relief for incompetent counsel,5 4 Stone creates a new
circumstance which may force the courts to reconsider the counsel's
participation in the forfeiture of the defendant's rights.55
In Louisiana, state habeas corpus proceedings should continue to
provide state prisoners with a cause of action for unreasonable searches and
seizures. The first basis for this belief lies in Article I, Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution which was clearly an attempt to expand fourth
amendment rights, 56 and in which the exclusionary rule is implicitly
guaranteed.57 The Louisiana provision grants standing to raise the claim of
unreasonable search and seizure in the "appropriate court'"'" and the
manner in which the Louisiana Supreme Court interprets this language will
determine the outcome of the prisoner's action on state constitutional
grounds.
51. See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 96
S. Ct. 1691 (1976); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
52. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970). Many of the lower courts have denied relief for claims which failed to
show that the trial was a "mockery of justice." Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. I, 28 & n.76 (1973).
53. E.g., Bastida v. Braniff, 444 F.2d 396(5thCir. 1971); Hintzv. Beto, 379F.2d
937 (5th Cir. 1967).
54. "Appellate courts have been so willing to excuse questionable decisions and
omissions as 'trial tactics' that almost any error can be ignored under that rubric."
Bazelon, supra note 52, at 38.
55. The preclusion of the constitutional issue from habeas corpus makes it
absolutely essential that the attorney raise constitutional issues at the appropriate
time and argue them properly.
56. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 23, 24 (1973); Jenkins, Declaration of Rights, 21 LoYotA L. REV. 9,
29 n.92 (1975).
57. Hargrave, supra note 56, at 22.
58. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5 provides: "[Any person adversely affected by a search
or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its
illegality in the appropriate court."
59. By concluding that the state habeas corpus proceeding is not the "appro-
priate court," the Louisiana Supreme Court could preclude state prisoners' claims
based on this provision.
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The second basis for this argument results from the wording of the state
habeas corpus statute, which provides a cause of action where the state
prisoner "was convicted without due process of law." 60 While the federal
statute speaks in terms of the prisoner's present status, 61 the Louisiana
provision refers to what has transpired in the past. It would appear
analytically sound to distinguish the two statutes by concluding that the state
prisoner was convicted in violation of due process, but having received
"full and fair litigation," is not being held in violation of the Constitution.
Stone, in conjunction with other recent decisions of the Court, 62 erodes
the substantive content of the exclusionary rule to a point where the Court
may be on the verge of complete abandonment of the rule as a constitutional
requirement,63 despite the clear language of Mapp,64 and marks a signifi-
cant departure from prior jurisprudence concerning the writ of habeas
corpus. In so doing, the Court left unanswered serious questions relating to
the adjudication of fourth amendment claims. Such confusion creates
potential areas of litigation and uncertainty concerning the States' new
role.65 Stone clearly signals a retreat in the area of individual rights but
where this retreat will cease is not indicated.
Joseph L. Shea
60. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 362(9).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides: ". . . on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution . . ." (emphasis added).
62. See Justice Brennan's dissent in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.
3074, 3087 (1976), and the cases cited therein.
63. See note 31, supra.
64. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
65. See text at notes 42-49, supra, where there is a discussion of the confusion
over the necessary state forums and the procedures to be followed in those forums.
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